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Conditional pricing practices-including bundled 
discounting, loyalty rebating, and market share 
discounts-are not new phenomena in the U.S. 
market. Their potentially exclusionary conse­
quences were raised in antitrust cases decades 
ago.1 But unlike tying or exclusive dealing-which 
have a rich history of case law and scholarly cover­
age-conditional pricing practices did not emerge 
as salient to the antitrust community until a little 
over a decade ago. Two federal appellate decisions 
in the early 2ooos-Concord Boat2 on market share 
rebates and LePage's3 on bundled discounting­
sparked a period of intensive interest and activity 
on these topics in the antitrust agencies, courts, 
bench, and legal and economic academy. Because 
the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet weighed in 
(and may not do so in the near future given the 
smal I number of antitrust cases it hears), the 
issues are largely in the hands of the lower fed­
eral courts and antitrust agencies, where there is 
nothing approaching consensus on how to apply 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act to conditional pricing 
practices. 
In this essay, I propose to provide a high level 
reflection on the development of the condition­
al pricing issue over the last decade in the U.S., 
articulate the current state of play, and speculate 
1 See, e.g., SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly&Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir.1978) 
(finding pharmaceutical company liable under monopolization 
law for exclusion through bundled discounts). 
2 Concord Boat v. Brunswick Corp., 207 F.3d 1039 (81h Cir. 2000) (reject­
ing claim of boat manufacturers that stern drive engine manufac­
turer suppressed competition through market share discounts). 
3 LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (en bane) (affirming 
jury verdict in favor of transparent tape manufacturer claiming 
that diversified rival harmed competition through use of bundled 
discounts) 
about where things may head in coming years. I 
have been a partisan rather than detached observ­
er in these engagements-representing clients in 
litigation and writing a number of scholarly papers 
on the topic, generally in opposition to intrusive 
antitrust scrutiny of loyalty-enhancing pricing 
practices.4 For purposes of this essay, however, it 
is not my goal to make the case in favor of condi­
tional pricing or antitrust restraint, but rather to 
provide a descriptive overview of the continuing 
course of this debate in the United States. 
Finding the Analogue: Disguised Preda­
tion or Something Else? 
Federal antitrust law has long been understood 
to be essentially a common law process,5 and the 
heart of common law reasoning is analogy. It is 
therefore unsurprising that American lawyers have 
tended to approach conditional pricing-an area 
without strong legal precedent-by asking "what 
known practice is this like?" Of course, analogies 
are always imperfect (otherwise the analogues 
would be the same thing) so, assuming that a close 
analogy to conditional pricing is detected, the 
question then is whether the rules governing that 
practice can be imported wholesale or whether 
they should be modified in some manner. 
4 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Bargaining Over Loyalty, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 253 
(2013); Can Bundled Discounts Raise Prices Withour Excluding Rivals?, 
Comp. Pol. lnt'I (Oct. 2009); Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Con­
sumer Welfare, 54 Emory L. J. 423 (2006); Multiproduct Discounting. 
A Myrh of Non-Price Predarion, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 27 (2005) 
5 See, e.g., William F. Baxter, Separarion of Powers, Prosecurorial Discre­
tion, and the "Common Law" Narure of Antirrusr Law. 60 Tex. L. Rev. 
661, 663 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 533, 544 (1983). 
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The two early cases of the current era of focusing 
on conditional pricing came to opposite con­
clusions on the analogy question. Much of the 
contestation over the legal treatment of condi­
tional pricing si nee that ti me can be understood 
as playing in_ the shadows cast by those two early 
cases-Concord Boat and LePage's. 
Concord Boat involved allegations by a number of 
boat manufacturers that Brunswick, the leading 
maker of inboard and stern drive marine engines 
with a market share between so% and 7S% de­
pending on the year, monopolized the boat engine 
market through market share discounts. Between 
1984 and 1997, Brunswick offered three tiers of 
first-dollar discounts-generally1o/o, Zo/o, Or3o/o, 
but in some years as high as so/a-to customers 
who purchased minimum percentages of their re­
quirements-generally ranging from 60% to 80%­
-from Brunswick. Brunswick eventually tried to 
raise its top tier to 9S%, but faced serious backlash 
from the boat manufacturers and discontinued the 
market share discount program altogether. 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
rejected the boat builders' claims under Sections 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act. It found that the market 
share discounts did not substantially foreclose 
competition, largely based on record evidence 
suggesting that boat manufacturers were able 
to switch large percentages of their purchases to 
alternative suppliers despite the presence of the 
market share discounts. Significantly, the court 
also seemed to hold that the market share dis­
counts would be per se legal if they did not cause 
Brunswick's prices to fal I below cost. The court 
distinguished cases involving bundled discounting 
and seemingly held that the single-product, above­
cost loyalty discounts are lawful on the authority of 
the U.S. Supreme Court's predatory pricing prece­
dents like Brooke Group and Matsushita.6 
LePage's involved a market share battle for trans­
parent tape between 3M, a manufacturing con­
glomerate that sold many different product lines 
of consumer products through mass merchant 
retailers, and LePage's, a smaller office supplies 
manufacturer. 3M dominated the transparent tape 
market through its Scotch tape brand with an over­
all share around 90%, but LePage's was the largest 
6 Brooke Group, Lrd. v. Brown & Williamson, 509 U.S. 209 ( 1993); Matsu­
shita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 4 75 U.S. 574 ( 1986). 
Conditional pricing and monopolization: a reflection on the state of play 
seller of private label transparent tape, with sales 
approaching 90% of that market sub-segment 
LePage's sued 3M for monopolizing the transpar­
ent tape market by offering retailers multi-tiered 
bundled discounts contingent upon purchases 
across multiple 3M product lines, including Health 
Care Products, Home Care Products, Home Im­
provement Products, Stationery Products (includ­
ing transparent tape) , Retai I Auto Products, and 
Leisure Ti me. 
Unlike the Concord Boat court, the U.S. Court of Ap­
peals for the Thi rd Circuit rejected 3M's argument 
that its bundled discounts could not be unlawful 
unless they resulted in below-cost pricing. The 
court interpreted the Supreme Court's predato-
ry pricing precedents narrowly-as essentially 
applying only in oligopoly settings or in uncondi­
tional price discount circumstances. "Rather than 
analogizing [bundled discounts] to predatory pric­
ing," the court observed, "they are best compared 
with tying, whose foreclosure effects are similar.''7 
Although dealing complex factual records and dif­
ferent kinds of contingent discounts, LePage's and 
Concord Boat offered a stark choice of analogies. 
Would courts and antitrust authorities approach 
loyalty rebates as disguised instances of predatory 
pricing subject to a cost-price test? Or would they 
reject predatory pricing analogies and roll loyalty 
discountanalysis into an analytical framework 
similar to the coercion and substantial foreclosure 
analysis characteristic of exclusive dealing and 
tying law? 
The Rise of the Discount Attribution Test 
Concord Boat did not trigger an immediate reaction 
in the antitrust community. But LePage's did. The 
initial reaction to LePage's was overwhelmingly neg­
ative. The Solicitor General of the United States, 
Justice Department, and Federal Trade Commis­
sion recommended that the Supreme Court deny 
certiorari, but were critical of the opinion, opining 
that the "court of appeals' failure to identify the 
specific factors that made 3M's bundled discount 
anticompetitive may lead to challenges to pro­
competitive programs and prospectively chill the 
adoption of such programs."8 The case met with 
7 324 F.3d at 155. 
8 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8, 3M Co. v. LePage's 
Inc., 540 U.S. 807, cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 2932 (May 28, 2004) (No. 
02- 1865), http/ /www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f203900/203900.pdf 
COMPETITION LAW & POLICY DEBATE I VOLUME 1 I ISSUE 1 I FEBRUARY 2015 45 -
- 46 
INTEL 
extensive scholarly condemnation, including from 
the highly influential Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise.9 
And in 2007, the bi-partisan Antitrust Moderniza­
tion Commission issued a report that was harshly 
critical of LePage's for failing to provide any clear 
guidance on when bundled discounts might be 
condemned as anticompetitive and potentially 
chilling procompetitive bundled discounts.10 
At the same time, relatively few commentators 
advocated applying an unmodified predatory pric­
ing rule to bundled discounts-effectively doing 
for bundled discounts what Concord Boat did for 
market share discounts. In the usual common law 
fashion, many commentators were persuaded that 
The LePage's case 
was initially 
subject to 
intense criticism 
predatory pricing was the closest analogy, but not 
a perfect one. Bundled discounts might exclude 
equally efficient competitors even though they 
did not result in predatory pricing. An often-cit­
ed example involving shampoo and conditioner 
developed by Janusz Ordover in Ortho Diagnostics, 
a bundled discount case in the mid-199os, was 
frequently used as an example of how a bundled 
discount could exclude an equally efficient com­
petitor and sti 11 survive the Brooke Group test for 
predatory pricing.11 
The logic of Ortho Diagnostics persuaded many in 
the antitrust community that predatory pricing 
law would need some modification before being 
applied to bundled discounts. A discount attribu-
9 3A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law P749, at 
305-49 (3d ed. 2008) 
10 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOM­
MENDATIONS 99 (2007) availablea1http:// govinfo.library.unt.edu/ 
amc/report_recommendation/amc_final_report.pd. 
11 Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 920 F. Supp. 455, 467 
(SONY 1996) 
ti on test began to gain currency with institutions 
like the Antitrust Modernization Commission, 
the Justice Department's Antitrust Division, and 
many academics. Its high point arrived in 2008 
with PeaceHealth, a decision by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ni nth Circuit adopting the dis­
count attribution test for bundled discounts.12 The 
PeaceHealth court adopted a test requiring that 
"a plaintiff who challenges a package discount as 
anticompetitive must prove that, when the full 
amount of the discounts given by the defendant is 
allocated to the competitive product or products, 
the resulting price of the competitive product or 
products is below the defendant's incremental 
cost to produce them."13 As the court observed, "[t] 
his requirement ensures that the only bundled 
discounts condemned as exclusionary are those 
that would exclude an equally efficient producer of 
the competitive product or products."14 
Intel: Extending PeaceHealth to Market 
Share Discount 
With PeaceHealth instituting a discount attribution 
test for bundled discounts with seemingly fairly 
broad acceptance in the antitrust community, 
there remained the question of how single-product 
market share rebates would be analyzed. Would 
the PeaceHealth logic spill over to market share 
discounts, or would a pure predatory pricing test, 
as suggested by Concord Boat. continue to control? 
The FTC provided a vague answer in its Decem-
ber 2009 administrative complaint against Intel. 
Although there were some allegations of bun­
dling across multiple product lines, the core of 
the Commission's complaint concerned Intel's use 
of market share discounts to prevent computer 
OEMs from giving a greater share of their business 
to Intel's principal rival, ADM. The Commission 
alleged that Intel's market share discounts resulted 
in predatory pricing-"purchases that are effective­
ly below cost.''15 The Commission did not explain 
how the "effective" price was computed, but it was 
widely understood to require a similar analysis to 
that employed by DC Comp in Provisional Decision 
against lntel.16 That approach requires identifying 
12 Cascade Heal1h Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883 (2008) 
13 Id. at 909. 
14 Id. 
15 In re Intel Corp., Complaint, http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/cases/091216intelcmpt.pdf. 
16 Comp 37 /990lntel http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/ICT/ 
intel_provisional_decision.pdf. 
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a non-contestable segment of the market and re­
allocating all of the discounts that segment to the 
contestable segment, and then inquiring whether 
the resulting price in the contestable segment is 
below the specified measure of cost. In essence, 
this is performing the PeaceHealth analysis for sin­
gle-product loyalty discounts. 
The Intel matter settled without judicial decision, 
so there was never any indication as to whether the 
courts would accept th is extension of PeaceHealth 
to the single-product discount context or continue 
to insist on a traditional predatory pricing test as 
suggested in Concord Boat. However, plaintiffs be­
gan to use the "contestable/incontestable" model 
in market share discount cases, on the assump­
tion that courts would be persuaded to apply the 
PeaceHealth test in this manner.17 As of the late 
years of the last decade, it seemed that the U.S. 
antitrust community might be settling into at least 
a tentative agreement on the use of predatory pric­
ing rules-with a discount attribution modifica­
tion-for all instances of alleged exclusion through 
conditional pricing. 
Discount Attribution Called into Question 
But a consensus position on the discount attribu­
tion test would not be so easily achieved. Events 
in the last few years have exposed the wide rifts 
that remain in the U.S. antitrust community on the 
appropriate treatment of conditional pricing. 
Two events in 2009 underlined the extent to which 
broad consensus remained elusive. First, the 
Obama Justice Department withdrew the Bush 
Administration's report on monopolization, which 
had included a proposal to institute the discount 
attribution test.18 Second, Harvard Law Professor 
Einer Elhauge published an influential article 
on tying and bundled discounting that sharply 
countered the academic criticism of LePage's and 
argued against the use of predatory pricing test 
for bundled discounts.19 Professor Elhauge has 
since authored a number of additional papers on 
conditional pricing that argue against predatory 
pricing rules. 
17 See, e.g., Eisai Inc v. Sonofi-Aventis U.S., LL(. 2014 WL 1343254 (D. 
N.J. 2014); In re Imel Microprocessor Litig., 201OW L8591815 (D. Del. 
2010) 
18 Justice Department Withdraws Report on Monopoly Law, http:// 
wwwjustice.gov /arr /public/press_releases/2009/ 24 5 71 O.htm. 
19 Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death aft he Single 
Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 Harv. L. Rev. 397 (2009). 
Conditional pricing and monopolization: a refiection on the state of play 
Judicial decisions concerning conditional pricing 
have been mixed. Several courts have dismissed 
market share discount cases, finding that the 
discounts were lawful competition on the merits 
that did not threaten competition.20 However, 
other courts have rejected the use of predatory 
pricing rules to address conditional pricing, such as 
market share discounts, at least in circumstances 
where the loss of discount could be construed as a 
"penalty" for disloyalty.21 
Further, some dissent from the use of predatory 
pricing analogies and discount attribution rules 
has arisen from quarters where it might not have 
been expected. On the milder side, Herbert Hoven­
kamp-a highly influential scholar and custodian 
of the Areeda-Turner treatise-recently posted a 
draft article pointing out the complexities of dis­
count attribution test, particularly in multi-product 
markets where the goods included in the bundle 
are purchased in varying proportions.22 On the 
stronger side, FTC Com missioner Josh Wright­
one of the most conservative Commissioners in re­
cent FTC memory-gave a speech in 4013 in which 
he criticized the use of price-cost tests for loyalty 
discounts and advocated an exclusive dealing 
approach instead.23 Standing alone, Commissioner 
Wright's comments provide little encouragement 
to proponents of more aggressive antitrust policing 
of loyalty discounts, si nee Josh has made clear that 
he believes proving harm to competition through 
exclusive dealing should be a high bar.24 Nonethe­
less, in combination with Professor Hovenkamp's 
cautions on the use of the discount attribution test 
and decisions like ZF Meritor, the pendulum seems 
to have swung somewhat away from the use of 
predatory pricing rules (modified or otherwise) in 
the last several years. 
20 E.g . . Southeast Missouri Hosp. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 642 F.3d 608 (8'h Cir. 
201 O); Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group LP, 
592 F.3d 991 (2009) 
21 ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 2012). 
22 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Areeda-Turner Test for Exclusionary Pricing: 
A Critical Journal, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.dm 7abstract_ 
id=2422120. 
23 Joshua D. Wright, Simple but Wrong or Complex but More Accurore7 
The Case for on Exclusive Dealing-Based Approach to Evaluating 
Loyalty Discounts, Remarks at the Bates White 1 O'h Annual Antitrust 
Conference, June 3, 2013, http://www.ftc.gov/public-state­
ments/2013/06/simple-wrong-or-complex-more-accurate-case­
exclusive-dealing-based. My debate with Steve Sa lop about Josh's 
comments appears at http://cruthonthemarket.com/2013/06/09/ 
wright-is-right-and-wright-is-wrong-a-response-to-steve-salop-on­
loyalty-discounts/. 
24 See In re Mc Wone, Inc.. Dissenting Statement of Commissioner 
Joshua D. Wright, http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
public_statements/202 21 1I140206mcwanestatement.pdf. 
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The 2014 FTC/DO) Hearings 
On June 23, 2014, the FTC and Justice Department 
jointly convened a day-long workshop to take the 
pulse of leading economists and lawyers on the 
state of knowledge on the competitive effects on 
conditional pricing practices.25 The agencies will 
likely release a report on the proceedings at some 
point and I will not attempt to summarize them 
here, but will provide some informal comments as 
a participant. 
To me, the headline from the day's proceedings 
was how far the U.S. antitrust community is from 
any sort of consensus on conditional pricing poli­
cies. The views expressed by the panelists ranged 
from something approaching a presumption of il­
legality for loyalty-inducing discounts by dominant 
firms to a safe-harbor for discounts that do not 
result in below-cost pricing-essentially Concord 
Boat without the discount attribution qualification. 
The panelists vigorously contested almost every 
angle on the topic-whether loyalty discounts 
are true economic discounts or simply disguised 
disloyalty penalties; whether conditional discounts 
can have anticompetitive effects without exclusion 
by softening competition and facilitating parallel 
supracompetitive pricing; whether conditional 
pricing is more similar to predatory pricing or 
exclusive dealing; whether prohibiting conditional 
pricing would have hydraulic effects toward more 
anticompetitive practices such as pure exclusive 
dealing or vertical integration; whether there are 
efficiencies attributable to conditional pricing that 
could not be captured through more competitively 
benign practices. These, and many other angles, 
were sharply contested. 
It remains to be seen what the agencies make of 
the workshop and how they use it rhetorically to 
justify any directions they may seek to pursue. 
One point that seems clear is that they would have 
a difficult time claiming the existence of broad 
consensus on almost any important facet of the 
current debate. The use of modified predatory 
pricing rules, once the seemingly anointed course, 
is now merely one proposal for discussion. 
Looking Forward 
We end 2014 with considerable uncertainty about 
25 See http) /www.ftc.gov/news-events/evems-calendar /2014/06/ 
conditional-pricing-practices-economic-analysis-legal-policy. 
the future of conditional pricing law in the United 
States. The possibility of the sort of formal, cate­
gorical disapproval of loyalty-inducing pricing by 
dominant firms reflected in the General Court's 
June 12, 2014 decision upholding Intel's liability26 
seems remote. Yet a wide range of possibilities, 
including at least an exclusive dealing model, pure 
predatory pricing rules, or a discount attribution 
test remain plausible. 
In the short term, there is unlikely to be much 
relief from the uncertainty. The Supreme Court 
is the only institution practically able to provide a 
conclusive answer, but it is unlikely to take a major 
step on conditional pricing until the dust settles. In 
technical areas like antitrust, the Court often waits 
for the formation of professional consensus in the 
relevant field before announcing broad rules. It 
has rejected a number of petitions for certiorari 
in conditional pricing cases, probably because the 
issue was not yet sufficiently crystallized in lower 
court opinions and expert opinion. Recent events 
will give the Court little encouragement to act any 
time soon. 
The longer run depends, of course, upon the com­
position of the Court, the possibility of consensus 
developing among the antitrust agencies and 
leading academics, and continuing developments 
in the lower courts. If anything is predictive, it is 
the Court's long-term trajectory since the 1980s 
towards protecting unilateral pricing decision from 
attack unless the pricing is predatory. In upholding 
the jury's verdict finding liability for loyalty dis­
counting, the ZF Meritor nonetheless court recog­
nized that the force of its earli.er LePage's opinion 
had "been undermined by intervening Supreme 
Court precedent,"27 including cases like Weyerhaus­
er28 on predatory overbidding and /i11kLi11e29 on 
price squeeze. If the Supreme Court stays on its 
current course, when it finally rules, it will do so in 
a way that provides event dominant firms a good 
bit of latitude in offering conditional or loyalty-in­
ducing prices. 
26 Imel Corp., Case T-286/09, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/ 
document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea 7d0fl 30dea92cbe 7 3 781 74eb­
d905893ea636 1f8e2.e 34Kaxilc3eQc40LaxqMbN40bhePe0?­
text=&docid= l 5354 3&pagel ndex=O&docla ng=EN&mode=l­
st&dir=&occ=fi rst&pa rt= 1 &cid=256025. 
27 696 F.3d at 273 n. 11. 
28 Weyerhaeuser Co. v Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co. 549 U.S. 
312 (2007) 
29 Poe. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc, 555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
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Finally, a word of strategic advice for those wishing 
to shape the terms of this debate. For better or for 
worse, the U.S. debate over the legal treatment of 
conditional pricing remains driven by the common 
law's obsession with analogy. Although econo­
mists often c;:hafe at the imperfection and over-and 
under-inclusion of analogies to existing practices, 
that is the way the courts tend to see the issue. In 
For better or worse, 
the U.S. debate over 
conditional pricing 
remains driven by the 
common law's 
obsession with analogy 
my opinion, one of the most useful presentations 
at the FTC/DOJ hearings was Michael Waldman 
and Michael Whinston's analysis of the claims that 
the Supreme Court has made about the attributes 
of price discounting that justify conservative struc­
turing of predatory pricing law and an inquiry into 
whether conditional pricing practices share those 
attributes.30 Professors Waldman and Whinston 
identified six such attributes and suggested that 
conditional discounts do not share the majority of 
them.31 While I disagree with some of their conclu­
sions, this approach is the kind that allows econo­
mists to speak influentially to courts on these sorts 
of challenging questions of economic policy. In my 
view, future contestation over legal treatment of 
conditional pricing practices will continue to play 
in the shadows of the known categories, particular­
ly predatory pricing, tying, and exclusive dealing. 
30 Michael Waldman & Michael Whinston, An Overview of Condirional 
Pricing Pracrices, http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/pub­
lic_events/302251 /wald ma n-whi nston.pdf 
31 Id. ("Need to reduce frivolous litigation;""Firms need to have a 
bright line;""Firms rarely have reasons to price below MC, and its 
hard to identify above-MC predation (akin to price regulation);" 
"When P>MC. forcing a higher price sacrifices short-run efficiency 
for speculative long-run gain;""lf P>MC. an 'equally efficient com­
petitor' can make sales;""lf P>MC, a firm whose presence is efficient 
can make sales:'). 
Conditional pricing and monopolization: a reflection on the state of play 
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